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Do Private Property Rights Promote Sustainability? 
Examining Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries 
Adam Soliman† 
Global marine fish resources have suffered from serious overfishing 
since 1950, and many marine resources are highly threatened. Var-
ious management regimes, including, but not limited to individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs), have been implemented worldwide to 
regulate fisheries. It is believed that ITQs have improved fishery 
management and restored declining fisheries to be sustainable. 
ITQs are designed both to: (1) provide an incentive to the individual 
fishers to protect the fishery by creating a financial interest in the 
fishery’s ongoing productivity, and (2) enable the government to 
manage the fishery effectively. Using this system, governments are 
able to limit the extraction of fish from the ocean. ITQs incentivize 
Fishers to limit their consumption in order to keep their ITQ and 
ensure there is future value in their ITQ. This study focuses on 
whether property rights, as implemented in the form of ITQs, effec-
tively increase the sustainability of a fishery. While ITQs do confer 
proprietary interests upon the quota holders, these interests fall 
short of full private ownership in a legal sense. Contrary to some 
claims, the property rights provided by ITQs are neither necessary 
nor sufficient to guarantee good stewardship of a fishery. However, 
this study argues these rights do create strong incentives for stew-
ardship, and have improved sustainability in many fisheries around 
the world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Since the 1950s the world’s marine fish resources have suffered 
from serious overfishing,1 and many fisheries are in great danger. 
Various management regimes have been implemented around the world 
in an effort to overcome this problem. One prominent management 
regime is the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. While ITQs 
exist in many jurisdictions, the schemes in New Zealand, Australia, 
Iceland, Canada and the United States are best known and most 
discussed. This study will use these schemes to understand the benefits 
of ITQs. An ITQ is, essentially, a license held by an individual or an 
organization, which provides them with a share of the total allowable 
catch (TAC) of fish.2 Like all licenses, it is a privilege allowed by the 
government of that nation. The specifics of each ITQ system may differ, 
but they all assign to individual fishers or companies a specific 
                                                 
1. Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 SCI. 
MAG. 788 (2006). 
2. Cindy Chu, Thirty Years Later: The Global Growth of ITQs and Their Influence on Stock 
Status in Marine Fisheries, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 217 (2008).  
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proportion of the amount that the government determines it can safely be 
fished. The TAC is generally based upon scientific data.3 ITQs are called 
transferable quotas because they can be bought and sold by any legally 
defined “person”4and they can be worth a significant amount of money. 
ITQs are a privilege and not property because they exist solely at the 
discretion of the government. Many analysts believe that the ITQ system 
has preserved sustainability in fisheries more effectively than the 
alternatives.5 Other researchers, however, do not believe that ITQs 
contribute significantly to sustainability,6 and heated arguments 
sometimes result. Reviewing and assessing these arguments is one of the 
main purposes of this paper. 
 Although it may not be immediately obvious, arguments about the 
effectiveness of ITQs, as a means of ensuring sustainable fisheries, are 
closely linked to a more legalistic and theoretical question: Can ITQs be 
properly classified as “property rights” or “ownership” in legal terms? 
Some theorists consider “Property” a bundle of rights7; these rights may 
include the ability to exclude others from the use of the property, the 
existence of a judicial relationship between the person and the property, 
and the entitlement to derive profit from the property.8 These rights 
appear to apply to the “owner” of an ITQ. But can the ITQ truly be 
considered “property” if the owner is still subject to government 
intervention, up to and including revocation of the ITQ without 
compensation? Does this mean that the quota is a mere “interest”, rather 
than a right, or that it is only a license or privilege rather than a form of 
property? 
 This paper begins by explaining the nature of ITQs in the context of 
historical trends in fisheries regulation.  Next, the paper addresses 
whether and to what extent ITQs confer property rights. The next section 
reviews the important controversy about whether or not property rights in 
general and ITQs in particular encourage socially beneficial stewardship, 
i.e., the avoidance of overfishing.  Then, the author sets out the criticisms 
                                                 
3. Timothy Essington et al., Catch Shares, Fisheries, and Ecological Stewardship: A 
Comparative Analysis of Resource Responses to a Rights-Based Policy Instrument, 5 
CONSERVATION LETTERS 186, 188 (2012). 
4. “Persons” also includes corporations. 
5. See, e.g., Gordon R. Munro et al., Impacts of Harvesting Rights in Canadian Pacific 
Fisheries, STAT. AND ECON. ANALYSIS SERIES NO. 1-3, 2009, at 6-13; Dietmar Grimm et al., 
Assessing Catch Shares’ Effects: Evidence from Federal United States and Associated British 
Columbian Fisheries, 36 MARINE POL’Y 654, 657 (2012). 
6. See, e.g., Daniel Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Receits of Fisheries Policy, 34 
FISHERIES 280, 290 (2009).  
7. BRUCE ZIFF, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 2-5 (1996). 
8. Id. 
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of ITQs as related to property rights as well as responses to those 
criticisms. Finally, the paper will assess the overall value of ITQs as a 
fisheries management tool. 
 This paper will argue that ITQs do confer a form of property right 
upon the quota holders.9 The nature of these rights differs significantly 
across jurisdictions because of differences in legislation and case law.10 
If ITQs were truly property rights, as opposed to privileges, then 
.governments could not take them without some form of compensation..  
If ITQs were truly property rights rather than privileges, then they would 
include the bundle of property rights associated with property law in that 
jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, ITQs have been recognized as 
property11 for certain specific purposes, while in others they are mere 
privileges.12 In all jurisdictions, however, ITQs do not provide their 
holders with all the characteristics of legal “ownership.” This is because 
ownership entails a specific set of rights including the right to be 
compensated if the property is taken, while ITQ licenses do not grant the 
right to compensation. It is possible that the TAC for a particular year, 
and therefore the proportion that an ITQ holder may catch, can be zero. 
 With respect to stewardship, proponents of ITQs generally argue 
that the absence of property rights is the source of the economic and 
sustainability problems in fisheries.13 Consequently, they predict that 
creating such rights should, in principle, alter the fishers’ behavior 
voluntarily towards sustainment of the resource.14 Others claim that 
private property rights are equally or more likely to motivate exploitation 
rather than stewardship. Thus, other legal mandates or constraints are 
required in order to ensure stewardship.15 This paper will show that for 
socially beneficial stewardship behavior to exist, exclusive private 
ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient. It will be argued, however, 
that a regime which includes appropriately structured property rights 
                                                 
9. See also Seth Macinko & Sarah Schumann, The Process of “Property”: Stasis and Change 
in Lobster Management in Southern New England, 33 VT. L. REV. 73 (2008). 
10. Id. 
11. Such as New Zealand and Australia. 
12. For example, Canadian and US common law treat ITQ licenses as property in some 
instances similarly to the division of estates and divorce  
13. See e.g., Donald R. Leal, Homesteading the Oceans: The Case For Property Rights in U.S. 
Fisheries, PERC POL’Y SERIES, Aug. 2000, at 1-36, available at http://perc.org/sites/default/files/ 
ps19.pdf; Ragnar Arnason, A Review of International Experiences with ITQs (Annex to Future 
Options for UK Fish Quota Management, CEMARE REP. NO. 58, 1 (2002), http://www.port.ac.uk/ 
research/cemare/publications/pdffiles/reportspdf/filetodownload,103922,en.pdf. 
14. Arnason, supra note 13, at 1; Chu, supra note 2. 
15. Bromley, supra note 6; Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheries for 
the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 646 (2004). 
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does provide effective incentives for socially beneficial stewardship, and 
is likely to require less enforcement effort and cost than regimes that 
provide no such rights. This does not, however, mean that stronger 
property rights are always better. Effective conservation actions often 
necessitate some limitations on the scope of the property rights that are 
conferred by ITQs.16  
II. THE NATURE OF ITQS 
A. Fisheries and “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
 The theory of the “tragedy of the commons”17 explains how 
multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally on behalf of 
their own self-interest, can deplete a shared limited resource, even when 
each knows that it is not in his own interest, nor in anyone’s long-term 
interest.18 The theory is widely known, but it can be argued whether it 
applies to certain specific situations. Fisheries, for example, have been 
described within the tragedy of the commons model but have significant 
limitations.19 Even across different jurisdictions, the general economic 
theory of the tragedy of the commons applies because of the inherent 
nature of fisheries.20 A fish stock is precisely this type of resource. The 
stock is shared, but (in the absence of any kind of regulation) each fisher 
owns only (and all of) those fish that he can catch. In English common 
law, this is known as the “rule of capture.”21 In such a fishery, it will be 
in the interest of an individual fisher to acquire as much fish as he can, 
which he can then of course sell for private profit.22 However, this will 
cause overfishing and exhaustion of the stock, which is not in anyone’s 
                                                 
16. These limitations are consistent with the FAO’s ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management which suggests that the government should be able to lower TACs if needed to 
conserve the resource, and not be impeded by other issues. 
17. Garrett W. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. MAG. 1243 (1968). 
18. Id. at 1243-1248. 
19. See, e.g., Donald R Leal, Community Run Fisheries: Preventing the Tragedy of the 
Commons, PROP. AND ENVT. RES. CTR., http://perc.org/articles/community-run-fisheries-0 (last 
visited June 4, 2014).  
20. Daniel Benjamin, Fisheries are a Classic Example of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” 19 
PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. 1 (2001), available at http://perc.org/articles/fisheries-are-classic-
example-tragedy-commons.  
21. Anthony Scott, Moving Through the Narrows: From Open Access to ITQs and Self- 
Government, in USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 105 (Ross Shotton ed., 
2000). 
22. Macinko & Schumann, supra note 9. 
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interest.23 Every member of the group suffers when the stock 
disappears.24 
 The tragedy of the commons applies to many environmental 
goods.25 Not surprisingly, the tragedy of the commons has been widely 
recognized to exist in traditional open access fisheries,26 although at 
times the predicted over exploitation never occurs due to a lack of 
demand created by a lack of access to markets. Most often, however, 
empirical evidence shows clearly that over-fishing has occurred.27 This 
has led governments around the world to restrict access to fishing in an 
attempt to save the common property fish stock.28 Proposed solutions 
usually include a permit system, in which the government either limits 
the rights of use or the conversion of the public good into private 
property. Thus, the permit system provides the individual with an 
incentive to maintain the property in good state.29  
 In most cases, the first step was the introduction of licenses.30 This 
was quickly followed by strict conditions on the licenses, often including 
an aggregate catch limit or TAC for the entire fishery. However, 
problems continued to exist.31 Fishermen developed strategies to evade 
restrictions on their licenses in order to catch the same amount of fish. 
For example, where fishing was reduced to a limited number of days per 
year, fishermen were quick to develop ways to fish in order to catch the 
same amount of fish within the reduced time period.32 Similarly, when 
regulations for vessels were introduced, fishermen were quick to enhance 
their fishing nets, enabling themselves to catch the same amount of fish 
with their smaller vessels.33 In other words, fishermen continued to find 
loopholes in the system that allowed them to continue overfishing.34 
                                                 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Patrick A. Nickler, A Tragedy of the Commons in Coastal Fisheries: Contending 
Prescriptions for Conservation, and the Case of the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 549, 576 (1999). 
26. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PNAS 
15181, 15182-15183 (2007). 
27. Chu, supra note 2 at 9. 
28. Munro et al., supra note 5. 
29. Christine Stewart, Legislating for Property Rights in Fisheries, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS 4-5 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5672e/y5672e00.pdf. 
30. See, e.g., id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 4-5 
34. Id. 
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B. The Transition to Output Control and Individual Quotas 
 Governments then started to restrict the amount of fish, and also 
entitlements to certain amounts of fish.35 Thus, the regulatory approach 
shifted from input control (controlling the amount of effort, type of gear, 
etc.) to output control (controlling the amount of fish fishermen can 
catch).36 Under an ITQ system, the regulator determines a total allowable 
catch (TAC) for each species of fish.37 The TAC is then divided into 
individual quotas (IQs), which are allocated to individual fishers or 
organizations.38 If regulations allow IQ holders to sell, buy or lease their 
quotas, then the quotas are individual transferable quotas, or ITQs.39 
Most but not all IQ schemes allow at least some trading to occur, and so 
most of these schemes are in fact ITQ regimes.40 Trading quotas is 
generally justified on the grounds of economic efficiency. The fishermen 
with the lowest costs will be able to place the highest bids for the ITQs.41  
 Although ITQs are meaningless without a TAC, it is entirely 
possible to implement a TAC without ITQs. When a TAC is used 
without individual quotas, the regulator sets the TAC, and then allows 
licensed fishers to fish until the TAC has been caught in aggregate.42 The 
regulator then closes the season, and any further fishing is prohibited 
until the next season opens.43 This type of regulation has been widely 
used in many countries.44 For example, the United States and Canada 
used this approach for several Pacific fisheries before the introduction of 
ITQs in the 1990s.45 Unfortunately, this type of regulation has failed in 
many ways. It has not effectively prevented overfishing46, yet has caused 
considerable economic hardship for fishers.47 
 To understand the reasons why many researchers predict that ITQs 
will help to prevent fisheries from falling victim to the tragedy of the 
commons, consider the difference between TAC-based regimes without 
                                                 
35. Suzi Kerr, James Sanchirico & Richard Newell, Evaluating the New Zealand Individual 
Transferable Quota Market for Fisheries Management, (Motu Working Paper No. 2003-02), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441061. 
36. Id. 
37. Stewart, supra note 29. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Arnason, supra note 13. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Munro et al., supra note 5. 
46. The enforcement by the regulators was not as stringent as that of IQs.  
47. Munro et al., supra note 5, at 6-13. 
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IQs and those with IQs. Where a TAC is not divided into individual 
shares, each fisher is entitled only to whatever amount he can catch 
before the total fleet reaches the TAC.48 This situation, called the “race to 
fish”, forces every fisher to catch as much as he can as quickly as he can, 
regardless of what effect this may have on the health of the stock.49 No 
fisherman can afford to take any action that would help protect the stock 
if that action would slow down his catch rate.50 If he did, the direct result 
would be a reduction in his total catch and his total profit. In contrast, 
where a TAC is divided into IQs, each fisher is entitled to that share 
regardless of how long he takes to catch it, and regardless of the actions 
of the rest of the fleet.51 Therefore, actions that would help protect the 
stock are not automatically penalized.52 
 Furthermore, because an ITQ is a percentage share of a TAC, and 
the TAC can change from year to year, it is in each fisherman’s self-
interest to take actions that will increase the TAC in future years by 
increasing the size and value of his share.53 In theory, this should 
motivate a fisherman to voluntarily avoid cheating (that is, catching more 
than the quantity allowed today by his ITQ), because such cheating 
might reduce the future TAC, and therefore reduce the future quantity he 
can catch under the same ITQ.54This paper will focus on whether this 
theory actually works to encourage sustainable fishing practices. Before 
addressing that question, however, it is necessary to understand the legal 
issues surrounding ITQs. Do they confer property rights on their holders, 
and if so, to what extent? The next section discusses the nature of 
property rights in general, and then analyzes ITQs in that context. 
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ITQS 
A. The Nature of Property Rights 
 Many questions have arisen regarding the legal status of ITQs, and 
whether they can be considered property.55 Property rights have been 
                                                 
48. Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. MAG. 
1678, 1679 (2008).  
49. Id. 
50. Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCI. MAG. 630 (1973). 
51. Dale Squires et al., Individual Transferable Quotas as a Fisheries Management Tool, 3 
REV. FISHERIES SCI. 141-169 (1995). 
52. Id. 
53. Leal, supra note 19. 
54. Id. 
55. Bromley, supra note 6. 
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widely defined and discussed.56 Many different interpretations exist.57 
One of the most influential interpretations holds that “property” is a 
bundle of rights, and that individual rights within this bundle can be 
separated, transferred, removed or added.58 This means that several rights 
of property may be attached to a single good.59 For example, one party 
may own a house, but if the owner decides to rent it out, then the tenant 
may also have rights with respect to that same house. Though the owner 
retains ownership, the tenant has the right to occupy and use the premises 
to the exclusion of others. 
 Property is generally understood, in the legal context, as a bundle of 
rights associated with some asset, either tangible or intellectual.60 One of 
the general assumptions of capitalism is that the capacity to own and 
“hold” property provides incentives to improve property, generating 
wealth.61 This understanding is the basis for the legal system that seeks to 
balance the interests of the property holder with the rest of society. The 
result of this is what has been called the “crystals” and the “mud” of 
property law.62 These are the hard-edged, well defined areas of the law, 
such as what is required for the sale of a piece of property under the law, 
and the less defined and harder to fully understand areas. ITQs fall into 
this latter camp; they are occasionally treated as though they were 
property, and occasionally are not. 
 One of the classic definitions states that “ownership” is composed 
of the following rights: (1) possession, management and control; (2) 
income and capital; (3) transfer inter vivos and on death; and (4) 
protection at law (for example, from expropriation).63 It is also 
recognized that ownership often comes with duties as well as rights,64 for 
example, ownership of a firearm. More importantly, the classic definition 
states that the rights are not necessarily unfettered and that ownership 
may, for example, not be immune from expropriation or seizure.65 Also, 
different bundles of rights may exist, and what is recognized as property 
                                                 
56. Stewart, supra note 29. 
57. Id. 
58. See J.E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. R. 711 (1996); 
ZIFF, supra note 7, at 2.  
59. Id. 
60.  Id. 
61. See, e.g., Sony Pellissery & Sattwick Dey Biswas, Emerging Property Regimes In India: 
What It Holds For the Future of Socio-Economic Rights?, (Nov. 22, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179717.  
62. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577-579 (1988).  
63. ZIFF, supra note 7 at 2-3. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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under private law, for example, may not receive the same recognition or 
protection under criminal law. 66 In Canada, for example, the Supreme 
Court determined in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia that aboriginal 
title is sui generis, meaning “of its own kind”, or unlike any normal kind 
of title.67 This concept is relatively unique to Canada, but has some 
interesting implications. In making this ruling, the Court noted several 
differences between aboriginal title and non-aboriginal title.68 For one 
thing, the range and uses of aboriginal title land is limited to the uses that 
“must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land, 
which forms the basis of the particular group’s aboriginal title.”69 In 
addition, aboriginal title is inalienable, except to the Crown.70 A 
community can only hold aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is 
constitutionally protected.71 
 As entitlements to property need to be judicially recognized in order 
for property rights to be enforceable, it is the legislature and/or the courts 
that validate property claims.72 The other extreme that has been argued 
includes Brubaker’s claim that the best methodology for protecting 
nature is through “a system of exclusive, transferable rights that has 
vested decision-making authority in individuals and firms who own or 
occupy land.”73  
 These property and proprietary interests can result in a variety of 
different situations aside from those previously mentioned. Different 
types of proprietary “interests” also exist that fall short of true 
ownership. They fall short because they, for one reason or another, do 
not provide the full body of rights associated with legal ownership. ITQ 
licenses fail to compensate individuals for the loss of their property if the 
ITQ rights change or the ITQ is revoked. These “interests” are generally 
recognized in jurisdictions worldwide, although perhaps under different 
names. They include: 
                                                 
66. Id. at 3-4. 
67. Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014 (Can.). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.  
71. Id.  
72. ZIFF, supra note 7. Therefore, ‘what is’ a property may very well depend on the jurisdiction 
in which such right is claimed. Ziff distinguishes two different approaches used by courts in their 
analysis of property rights. One is the ‘attributes approach’, which has a court look at the elements of 
the rights in order to determine whether they fit the property picture; the other approach is the 
‘purpose’ approach, which very much reflects the needs of society. 
73. ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE 19(1995). 
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(a) Incorporeal hereditaments: these are rights to have access to, or 
to exploit certain land resources.74 Easements and profits a prendre 
are two of the more familiar examples.75 Easements are generally 
defined as the right to cross or otherwise use someone else’s land 
for a specified purpose.76 Easements most commonly appear in cas-
es of adjoining lands, where the owner of one land needs to cross 
the other owner’s land to gain access to a public road.77 Easements 
cannot be revoked once granted, as they are proprietary interests.78 
They can be enforced both against the grantor and third parties.79 
Profits a prendre are such interests as mineral rights or water rights, 
which allow the grantee to take specific types of natural produce 
from another’s land.80 Profits a prendre are more flexible, in that 
any kind of use of the land can be granted, whereas easements are 
primarily rights to passage.81 
(b) License: A license is a permit from an authority to own or use 
something, do a particular thing or carry on a trade. Common ex-
amples are alcohol or weapons license. There are four types of li-
censes: (i) bare licenses, (ii) contractual licenses, (iii) licenses by 
proprietary estoppels, and (iv) licenses coupled with an interest.82 
As different legal concepts which represent partial interests to land, they 
receive different protections under the law. 
B. Community Property Rights 
 The concept of communal property rights can be contrasted with 
individual property rights. In Canada, this question frequently arises in 
the context of property rights in aboriginal communities,83 with a key 
difference being how the property rights are allocated. Each individual 
member of the community is generally able to access the property in 
question, and management is generally operated through the community 
                                                 
74. Daniel K. Brough, Alternatives in Accretion: Why There Is Not Yet an Appropriate Solution 
to the Application of Accretion Law to Mineral Estates, 2004 BYU L. REV. 169, 204 (2004). 
75. Id. 
76. Builders Supplies Co. of Goldsboro, N. C., Inc. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 192 S.E.2d 449 
(1972). 
77. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105, 1110 (2003). 
78. Greenwood v. Rahill, 122 R.I. 759, 412 A.2d 228, 230 (1980). 
79. S.H. GOO & ALICE LEE, LAND LAW IN HONG KONG 664 (3d ed. 2009). 
80. ZIFF, supra note 7. 
81. However, conservation easements were created as a way to compensate landowners for 
restricting the use and development of their property. See generally Bill Garber, Conservation 
Easements: Growth, Abuses, and Regulation, 72 APPRAISAL J. 175 (2004). 
82. GOO & LEE, supra note 79. 
83. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014 (Can.). 
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as a whole. This situation results in a number of different structural and 
management choices, the analysis of which would constitute a paper in 
and of itself.  
 Communal property rights provide an alternate methodology 
through which property rights and ITQs can be considered. The Alaskan 
Community Quota Entities (CQE)84 is an example of just this model; the 
community is able to hold the ITQ as though it were a piece of property 
communally held and it is able to manage it in their own way. Other than 
adding what is, conceptually, an additional layer of management in the 
form of the community, the communal property rights system differs 
little from an individual holding property rights. What this does show, 
however, is that ITQs can function as a piece of property in both a 
communal and a private context.  
C. ITQs as Property Rights 
 With respect to ITQs and property, the most fundamental question 
is whether an ITQ confers full ownership of “property” upon the holder, 
or rather a “proprietary interest” such as a license coupled with a profit a 
prendre. In 2004, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
analyzed the nature of ITQs and their relation to property rights.85 The 
FAO’s objective was to help legislators carefully and correctly define 
ITQs so as to avoid undesired results, such as costly and time-consuming 
compensation claims upon revocation of rights, or full property rights 
claims.86 The FAO concluded that although ITQs can be effective tools 
to limit the environmental impacts of fishing, they have a variety of 
societal effects which may be concerning.87  
 According to the study, the key features of property are: (1) a 
judicial relationship that exists between a person and a thing; (2) 
privileges and powers that are open-ended (they cannot be finitely 
listed); and (3) a holder that is entitled to self-seekingness (the holder can 
derive profit or other benefit from the property).88 If any of these three 
features is absent, there is no full property right.89The study then 
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examined what happens if any of these elements is absent, and 
established two categories of non-ownership situations:90 
1. “Quasi-ownership interests” exist in the absence of self-
seekingness.91 For example, public officials in public agencies are 
not self-seeking—the public derives the benefit, not the official. 
Nevertheless, these officials have an interest in whatever they over-
see, which is analogous to ownership in some respects. 
2.  “Non-ownership proprietary interests” lack open-endedness 
because their content is limited.92 These interests are usually created 
for a very specific purpose so that only very specific rights and 
powers are created with regard to the good.93 The study further 
breaks this category down into three types of interest:  
(a) rights to enjoy some specifically granted category of the use 
privileges that are included in the original ownership (i.e. profit 
à prendre and easements); 
(b) rights to deny the owner of some of his use privileges (i.e. 
the right to light and the right to support); and 
(c) rights to subtract some monetary value out of the wealth po-
tential of the resource (i.e. mortgages and charges).94  
 In fisheries, ITQ schemes are private property regimes to the extent 
that a fisher who holds a share of the TAC has an exclusive right to 
harvest that part of the annual catch of fish.95 They differ from fishing 
rights or licensing schemes under which mere “privileges” (such as 
permits for fishing activities) are granted.96 In these licensing schemes, 
ownership fully remains with the public as represented by the 
government, and mere rights to use are granted.97 These rights to use are 
not exclusive or transferable.98 ITQs, in contrast, provide exclusive rights 
to harvest.99 It is this authorization (rather than the fish) that can be sold, 
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leased and dealt with by the holder100; therefore, property rights may 
exist with regard to the quota, which is the exclusive right to harvest.101 
 The right to harvest is far from unlimited.102 In a bid to protect the 
natural resource at stake, nations restrict and limit this entitlement.103 If 
the natural resource continues to deplete, states will generally wish to be 
able to revoke or reduce these harvest rights.104 In order to avoid lengthy 
procedures and allow for swift management, such restrictions are usually 
laid down in law. The ITQ is framed in such a way as to avoid 
recognizing it as “property” in a legal sense105; some laws speak of 
“quotas,” some describe the rights as “quotas allocated to a license,” and 
others confer “entitlements” under “licenses or permits.”106 
 Even though it is clear that “full” property rights are never granted, 
the result of these descriptions is usually that the rights are ambiguous 
and open to interpretation—coincidentally, much like actual property 
rights.107 The effort to avoid recognition as “property” is the reason why 
quotas are usually granted for free; governments generally want the ITQ 
to be seen as a restricted license, permit or quota—that is, as a 
proprietary interest that does not amount to full ownership—and fear that 
the payment of a fee for such entitlement could give rise to monetary 
claims in case of later expropriation, revocation or reduction of that 
entitlement.108  
 There also appears to be a correlation between the presence of 
legislation requiring compensation for deprivation of property and the 
desire to avoid giving property right status to ITQs.109 In the US, where a 
requirement for such compensation is enshrined in the Constitution, 
legislation explicitly states that quotas are not property.110 In New 
Zealand, where no such constitutional requirement exists, more extensive 
property rights are granted using quotas.111  
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 The study identifies New Zealand and Iceland as the two countries 
with the most comprehensive ITQ legal frameworks.112 New Zealand has 
a Quota Register that works much like a land title register, retaining 
documentation relating to ownership, mortgagee or caveator rights of 
ITQs.113 Furthermore, the statute explicitly states that quota holders are 
entitled to compensation should their quota be terminated.114 The quotas 
can also be freely transferred. Finally, the quotas are explicitly 
permanent in nature, although the quantum of allocation depends on the 
annual TAC.115 
 The New Zealand system contrasts starkly with the situation in the 
USA, for example, where legislation explicitly provides that ITQs do not 
create any kind of property right, and that no compensation is payable in 
case of revocation of the rights.116 US legislation describes ITQs 
explicitly as permits only.117 Stewart summarizes this system as “based 
on the concepts of the people’s ownership of the resource, the 
government’s sovereign right to conserve and manage it, and an open-
access regime.”118 Many have argued that the right granted by the United 
States is more of a “revocable privilege” than any kind of property 
right.119 
 Canada, similarly, is reluctant to grant property status to ITQs.120 Its 
legislation therefore explicitly states that no property rights are granted 
and refers, inter alia, to a buy-back scheme rather than “compensation,” 
as compensation is normally reserved for expropriation of property. 
Canadian legislation explicitly defines licenses as a “privilege,” not as 
“property.”121 
 However, legislation is not the only relevant consideration as the 
courts may establish precedents in case law that differ from the 
intentions of the legislators.122 The FAO study notes that licenses that are 
(1) permanent; (2) exclusive; (3) transferable; and (4) secure are 
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considered very similar to property rights by some courts.123 However, 
most fishing rights and licenses only carry some of these characteristics, 
and only carry them to a certain extent.124 
 The precise status of fishing rights depends in part on the statute 
under which they are created.125 Some courts, however, have 
distinguished different scenarios; protection of the right between private 
parties, in contrast to protection of the right between a private party and 
the state.126 Often, courts have been much more willing to find that 
property rights exist in the first scenario than in the second.127 Finally, 
even in regard to these questions, courts hold different views, stemming 
mostly from property doctrines and relevant constitutional provisions.128 
 Historically, it has been recognized that property in fish is vested in 
the public.129 This was also established in the leading US case of Arnold 
v Mundy,130 which found that the property in navigable waters and the 
submerged lands beneath them was vested in the sovereign, not for the 
sovereign’s use but for the use of citizens.131 However, largely in 
response to the reality of over-fishing, it has also been recognized that 
this public property right is subject to abrogation by statute.132 
 Stewart also points out that it is necessary for states to classify 
fishing rights as less than property rights, as anything else would violate 
the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, which holds that no one can give 
what he does not have (own).133 As the property of fish lies with the 
public rather than with the government itself, the legislator is not 
authorized to transfer such property.134 This problem is avoided when the 
state hands out licenses and permits rather than full property rights.135 
 In New Zealand, courts treated ITQs as property to some extent, 
with the court in Jensen v. Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries 
&The Quota Appeal Authority,136 classifying ITQs as “valuable assets.” 
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However, it has also been held that ITQs can be revoked without an 
entitlement to compensation.137 The Court of Appeals in New Zealand 
Federation of Commercial Fishermen Inc. v. Minister of Fisheries138 
described fishing rights as a “species of property” that is subject to the 
provisions of the legislation which creates them.  
 Australia has granted limited property right status to ITQs. In 
Edwards v. Olsen139, the Court held that licenses were clearly property, 
“absent some express statutory provision to the contrary,” because 
licenses are transferable.140 The approach in Edwards was slightly 
different than the approach in cases between private parties and the state. 
In the leading case, Harper v. Minister for Sea Fisheries & Others141, 
fishing rights were considered “akin” to full property rights and were 
said to be like profit a prendre, but ultimately were not considered full 
property rights. As they are not full property rights, they are subject to 
uncompensated revocation if necessary.142 
 US courts, on the other hand, tend to treat ITQs as not being a form 
of property. One case described ITQs as “transferable permits to fish for 
a fixed percentage of the annual aggregate catch quota for the species 
and area.”143 The court in Foss v. National Marine Fisheries Service144, 
took a somewhat different approach; it classified the ITQ permit as 
“property,” but simultaneously stated that there was no property claim in 
the fish themselves. 
 Like the US, Canada has usually been reluctant to treat ITQs as 
property. In Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada145, the Supreme Court 
considered that a fishing license was not property under common law, 
but rather a license coupled with a proprietary interest in the harvest. 
Nevertheless, considering then the “major commercial” value of the 
license and the fact that they can be sold and leased, it held that these 
licenses were property within the (limited) meaning of the Banking and 
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Insolvency Act.146 This implies that the licenses (which, it should be 
noted, are not ITQs) are proprietary interests at the least. 
 The property rights status of Canadian ITQs was also tested in 
Malcolm v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries). In this case, Graeme 
Malcolm, on behalf of all commercial halibut license holders, sought 
judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Fisheries to change the 
split of TAC from 88% commercial with 12% recreational to 85% 
commercial with 15% recreational.147 The reduction in ITQs held by the 
license holders resulted in fewer pounds of halibut that could be landed 
and sold by the applicant and other commercial fisherman.148 The parties 
to this lawsuit agreed that the appropriate scope of review was 
reasonableness, putting the question to the court as to whether the 
Minister’s action was purely administrative, a policy decision, or a 
political decision (which would not be justiciable).149 This was an 
application of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, which described 
reasonableness as a flexible deferential standard that varies with the 
context and the nature of the impugned administrative act.150 The 
applicant claimed that the action was primarily legislative in nature (thus, 
justiciable), and sought to utilize the doctrines of both promissory 
estoppel and legitimate expectations to further the claim.151 The court 
found both of these to be inapplicable to the current case.152 Promissory 
estoppel did not apply because although the applicant established that he 
and other commercial license holders relied upon representations by the 
Minister, which was not sufficient because promissory estoppel cannot 
prevent a minister from exercising a broad statutory mandate to act in the 
public interest.153 Similarly, legitimate expectations can only be used to 
challenge the process used to make the decision, not the ultimate 
result.154 This case confirmed the power of the Minister to make changes 
to the TAC and alter the distribution if the need necessitates.155  This 
change can be done without court interference and is further proof that 
ITQs in Canada do not confer full ownership because the court has, in 
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effect, held that they are privileges that can be revoked without 
compensation.156 
 Furthermore, in the Canadian case of Knowles Estate v. Knowles,157 
the main point of contention between the parties asked who was entitled 
to benefit from the sale of the late Carl Alvin Knowles’ fishing licenses. 
The Court held that the fishing licenses were not marital property under 
the Matrimonial Property Act,158 but nevertheless were “business assets” 
which could be divided under section 22 (2.1) of the Devolution of 
Estates Act 159. There is a general similarity between this finding and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Saulnier; both courts did not consider 
licenses to be “property” in the full sense, but found that they were 
subject to certain provisions of certain specific statutes. 
 When comparing case law from different jurisdictions, it is 
necessary to consider the different contexts in which these cases arise.160 
The precise nature of the property right involved is seldom the turning 
point of a case. More often, property rights are discussed as a point of no 
ultimate legal significance.161 Rather than, for example, granting fishers 
certain rights so as to improve their security in relation to that right, 
many cases focus on the possibility of granting secure proprietary 
interests to third parties, such as moneylenders.162 As a result, the 
question of property is considered in relation to different laws, from 
differing perspectives and for different purposes, which leads to multiple 
and differing interpretations.163 
 Stewart concludes that ITQs do not constitute full private 
ownership164; the characteristics of transferability (whether the property 
can be transferred), exclusivity (whether the owner is able to exclude 
others from the use of the good), security (whether the entitlement can be 
revoked or determined by the state) and durability (whether ownership is 
unlimited in time and doesn’t expire) are not present to their fullest 
degree.165 However, ITQs do have certain qualities in common with full 
property rights, such as the fact that they can be leased and sold.166 Most 
                                                 
156. Id. 
157. Knowles v. Knowles, [2011] NBQB 43 (Can.). 
158. Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A 2000, c. M-8 (Can.). 
159. Devolution of Estates Act, RSNB 1973, c. D-9 (Can.).  
160. Stewart, supra note 29. 
161. Id. 
162. See, e.g., Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada, [2008] SCJ No 60, [2008] SCR 166. 
163. Stewart, supra note 29. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
264 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 4:1 
 
jurisdictions recognize that quotas are at least a form of profit à prendre, 
and in some cases, somewhat more.167 Sometimes, they are even 
(confusingly) considered “property” for such purposes as insolvency 
legislation, as in the Saulnier case from Canada.168 Nevertheless, because 
of the limitations on security and durability, quotas are more accurately 
described as “non-ownership property interests,” than as complete 
property rights that are tantamount to full ownership.169 
D. Driesen’s Criticism of Property Rights 
 Many researchers have criticized the use of property law to attempt 
to solve environmental problems. Driesen posits that property is often 
utilized as a force for stability within economic systems, but that modern 
property law often undervalues social functions of property.170 These 
concepts are further developed in the Coase Theorem171, which states 
that property is a legal concept that serves only to provide value to assets 
so negotiation can occur.172 This supports Driesen’s view that property is 
a tool for stabilizing complex economic systems. The result of these 
positions is that private property rights are focused rights with which an 
economic value can be associated, rather than the social concepts of 
ownership. This conceptualization, however, requires that a consequence 
of an action be known in order for that consequence to be reflected in the 
economic valuation. An example is the difficulty of obtaining complete 
knowledge about environmental effects, which results in these effects 
being ignored when the value of a piece of property is determined. The 
value of a given amount of quota under an ITQ system, for instance, 
depends on whether the TAC is correct—something which is rarely 
knowable with certainty.  
 Driesen’s view that property cannot address the environment is 
based on his view of the inherent purpose of property. Driesen suggests 
that property is merely a method of associating value for negotiation and 
for the assignment of scarce assets throughout society.173 Driesen’s 
theory of property rights is not inconsistent with communal rights, 
however. Nevertheless, if this concept of property is used to address 
environmental issues, Driesen predicts that it will fail because of market 
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inefficiencies. Although Hardin’s model identifies systemic risks to the 
system, what it fails to do is determine what would happen if the herders 
were entirely unaware as to how the environment would be affected by 
their actions. The situation in most fisheries is not that fishers suffer from 
a complete lack of knowledge, but rather that there is incomplete 
knowledge that can still address the problem at hand. Perfect knowledge 
is not required to be able to extrapolate the safe levels of fishing 
required, and the herder’s assumption that is used as a criticism of the 
Hardin model does not apply, particularly when the resources of a 
government can be used to address the informational problems. 
IV. EVALUATING ITQS 
A. Introduction 
 Researchers and academics are engaged in an important debate 
about whether property rights and ITQs are an effective and cost-
efficient method of preventing over-fishing and maintaining sustainable 
fisheries.174 This debate is made even more complex by the multiple 
definitions of “property rights,” described in the previous section.175 In 
many cases, different researchers reach different conclusions and hold 
different opinions because they have unwittingly used different 
definitions of “property rights” and “ownership.”176 As a result, many of 
the arguments are difficult to analyze, and even more difficult to 
resolve.177 
 The following subsections first describe the arguments against ITQs 
as an effective means of promoting sustainability, as expressed by Daniel 
Bromley.178 The next subsection unpacks the arguments in favor of 
ITQ’s for promoting sustainability. Following this section, a short 
discussion of some criticisms of ITQ’s, unrelated to sustainability, but 
arise as a result of viewing ITQ’s as property rights. 
B. Bromley’s Criticisms of ITQs for Sustainability 
Daniel Bromley’s 2009 paper ‘Abdicating Responsibility’ attacked many 
earlier studies that supported and promoted ITQs.179 Bromley argued that 
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it was a “myth” to claim that a fishery can be sustained using a free 
market system without government intervention. In his view, a system 
with catch share allowance requires government intervention and 
management in order to function well.180 His arguments are based on 
what he calls the ‘five core deceits’ of fisheries’ policy:181 
 
(1) Over-fishing can be blamed on missing property rights; 
(2) Private ownership is necessary and sufficient for socially 
beneficial stewardship; 
(3) ITQs must be of infinite life and freely tradable in order to 
produce the desired efficiency and stewardship properties; 
(4) ITQs are private property; and 
(5) ITQs are necessary and sufficient to produce efficiency, and to 
maximize resource rent, in a fishery.182 
 
 Bromley correctly points out that many economists use terms such 
as “property rights” and “ownership” vaguely and inconsistently.183 
Stated earlier in this paper, using vague and inconsistent terms is a 
common problem that makes it difficult to understand, compare and 
analyze arguments. It also tends to create and intensify disagreements. 
Unfortunately, Bromley does not state a detailed and specific definition 
of “property rights” either, making his reasoning no easier to work with 
than the arguments of those whom he criticizes.184 
 With respect to the first “core deceit,” Bromley neglects to present 
any argument showing why he believes to be false.185 As stated earlier in 
this paper, the view that over-fishing is a result of missing property rights 
is based on the theory of the “tragedy of the commons.”186 According to 
this theory, when fishers have rights to any fish that have not been 
caught, fishers act out of self-interest and seek to catch every possible 
fish before someone else can.187 In order to show that this claim is, or 
could be, a “deceit,” Bromley needs to outline the reasoning and then 
show how it is flawed. He does neither.188 
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 Bromley offers an alternative explanation for over-fishing: people 
over-fish because “their desire for the control of future value exceeds the 
rate at which a renewable natural resource can produce future value.”189 
While this is almost certainly true, it is little more than a restatement of 
one of the fundamental assumptions of economics, which is that people 
will always prefer more value to less. Therefore, it is true about any 
economic actor in any situation. It does not explain why fisheries are so 
often over-fished while other economic activities appear to be 
sustainable without significant intervention. 
 Bromley further claims that over-fishing can be (and should be) 
prevented, not by applying property rights, but by imposing constraints 
and penalties.190 In principle, this is true. Sufficiently intense (and costly) 
enforcement can probably preserve a fish stock. Bromley’s evidence, 
unfortunately, refutes his claim rather than supports it. He says: “Human 
societies, over a rather long history, have figured out how to prevent all 
manner of unwanted activities and outcomes—from child pornography to 
organized dog fighting;”191 and, argues that the same approach can work 
to prevent over-fishing. Unfortunately for Bromley’s argument (and for 
all of us), child pornography and organized dog fighting are both alive 
and well, despite society’s best efforts.  
 Bromley’s second “core deceit” is partly a restatement of the 
first.192 The first “deceit,” according to Bromley, is the claim that over-
fishing is caused by the absence of property rights.193 This is equivalent 
to a claim that property rights are necessary to prevent over-fishing, and 
this is half of the second “deceit.” In full, Bromley’s second “deceit” is 
the claim that property rights are both necessary and sufficient for 
preventing over-fishing.194 
 Bromley first claims that property rights are not necessary; 
according to him, the only necessary condition for sustainability is that 
“a renewable resource will be used (“drawn down”) at a rate that does 
not diminish its capacity to reproduce itself in subsequent time 
periods.”195 While this is true, it is little more than a definition of 
sustainability. It does not address the question that economists and 
fisheries managers are interested in, which is how this goal is best 
achieved. According to Bromley, private property is not necessary to 
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achieve this goal. For example, users do not deplete timber resources in 
the US, to which no private property rights are granted.196 
 Bromley also argues that private ownership is not sufficient because 
a private owner will prefer to derive income now rather than in the 
future, and, therefore, will exhaust the resource.197 As evidence for this, 
he points to the fact that even though land is privately owned, laws such 
as the Washington State Forest Practices Act,198 and government 
agencies such as the Soil Conservation Bureau, are often required to 
protect the land and its produce. If private ownership were sufficient to 
ensure good stewardship, then such interventions would be redundant.199 
 As further evidence that private ownership is not sufficient in itself, 
Bromley points to the fact that most ITQ schemes involve substantial 
enforcement efforts, such as mandatory cameras on fishing vessels and 
physical dockside checks.200 In his view, this demonstrates that ITQs are 
not creating a strong enough motivation for fishers to choose voluntarily 
to conserve.201 He suggests that fishers do not perceive their ITQs as 
reasonable guarantees of significant long-term value because they expect 
that the fish stock could easily be destroyed by some factor other than 
overfishing, such as climate changes or pollution.202 
 This aspect of Bromley’s interpretation is questionable on at least 
two grounds. First, especially in the light of the management failure of 
many of the regimes that existed before the introduction of IQs, it 
appears likely that enforcement has been inadequate in the past.203 If this 
were true, then the additional enforcement effort, that accompanied the 
introduction of IQs, would have been equally necessary if the previous 
regime had remained in place.204 
 Second, the fact that a certain set of laws requires enforcement does 
not in itself mean that those laws are failing to set up the right 
incentives.205 No one would claim that contract law, for example, fails to 
encourage desirable behavior merely on the grounds that it is backed up 
by a large and costly enforcement structure. The fact that contracts need 
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enforcement in order for a contract-based legal system to work properly 
does not mean that contract law creates the wrong incentives. It just 
means that contracts without adequate enforcement are not really 
contracts. Similarly, if there is not enough enforcement to ensure that a 
fisher will not exceed the amount defined by his IQ, then it can be argued 
that the IQ is not really a quota. Hilborn et al. (2004) suggest that the 
inability to enforce quotas explains why an IQ scheme in British 
Columbia’s abalone fishery failed, even though several other IQ regimes 
in the same area succeeded.206 
 Despite the limitations of Bromley’s evidence, it can be concluded 
that private ownership is neither absolutely necessary, nor fully sufficient 
for socially responsible stewardship. Bromley supplies at least one valid 
counterexample to each of these claims, and others can undoubtedly be 
found.207 The necessity, or sufficiency, of private ownership, however, is 
probably not the most interesting or useful question to address. Bromley 
and his opponents might contribute more by accepting that absolute 
necessity or full sufficiency do not exist in this case, and by arguing 
instead over which approach is likely to work better, and under what 
conditions. In short: will some form of property rights generally achieve 
greater sustainability and/or lower management costs compared to 
alternative schemes which do not include property rights? 
 It is interesting to point out at this stage that public ownership does 
not necessary exclude private ownership.208 A notable example is that of 
local customary rights, which play a role in fisheries in, inter alia, New 
Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada.209 For example, New 
Zealand reserves a proportion of the total catch for indigenous Maoris, 
and Alaska has attempted to enable remote communities to use non-
profit organizations to acquire halibut quota.210 As mentioned before, 
customary rights are considered public rights in that the rights are 
granted to a fluctuating body of members. This view is consistent with 
that of Ziff, who points to the overlap between private and common 
rights on the one hand, and public and common rights on the other. 
Private property can, after all, be owned by a joint group of people who 
have been granted common rights.211 Such common rights often create 
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the perception of public ownership, such as in the case of a highway, 
which is in fact owned by public authorities, but to which all members of 
the public have a right.212 
 Bromley’s third “deceit” is the view that ITQs must have an infinite 
life and tradability in order to work.213 He provides little or no evidence 
against this claim however. The argument that supports perpetuity is part 
of the argument that supports the need for property rights. As already 
noted, Bromley is unable to attack this argument because he does not 
even describe it. In practice, however, it is significant to note that no 
jurisdiction has implemented ITQs that are truly perpetual; all regulators 
have reserved certain rights to reduce, revoke, or buy back quota.214 
Furthermore, all regulators impose at least a few limitations on trading, 
such as a cap on the total share that any one person or company can hold, 
or reservations of quota for certain groups.215 In other words, Bromley’s 
third “deceit” is something of a straw man, as no fishery regulators have 
actually set up such a regime. 
 Bromley identifies an important problem, however, when he 
suggests that perpetuity may not provide enough incentive for fishers to 
conserve.216 He argues that there is a high risk that other factors outside 
anyone’s control could destroy future catches even if fishers do 
conserve.217 As a result, he believes that the present value of conserved 
fish is too small to be an incentive for conservation.218 The present paper 
already noted that the riskiness of future catches could partly explain 
why ITQ schemes seem to need significant enforcement effort. Clearly, it 
would be valuable to learn more about the riskiness of future catches, 
and to assess whether there are ways of reducing the level of 
uncertainty.219 
 Bromley’s fourth “deceit” is the simple claim that ITQs are 
property.220 According to Bromley, this is false. ITQs are “permits and 
nothing more.”221 In order to support this claim, he quotes American 
legislation, which explicitly states that ITQs “shall not create, or be 
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construed to create, any right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the 
fish is harvested by the holder.”222 As this paper has already shown, 
however, the question of whether property rights exist cannot be safely 
answered simply by referring to legislation. Precedents, judicial 
decisions and constitutional constraints can also create or weaken 
property rights.223 The legislation referenced by Bromley is best seen as 
an attempt by the legislator to reduce the risk that future court decisions 
might create an obligation for the government to pay compensation if it 
revokes an ITQ.224 There is no guarantee that such an attempt will 
succeed. 
 In his discussion of the fourth “deceit,” Bromley at one point makes 
the strange claim that ITQs are equivalent to TACs, “so when they tell us 
that they found 121 fisheries using "catch shares" they should have told 
us that they found 121 fisheries in which TAC limits had been 
introduced.”225 Although he states the opposite later in the same page (“If 
one wished to test the stewardship properties of catch shares (IFQs), the 
careful researcher must analyze a large number of TAC-controlled 
fisheries and then find some that have introduced IFQs.”), his implication 
that ITQ supporters have treated ITQs as equivalent to TACs is false. 
Munro et al., for example, focused very strongly on the difference 
between TACs with ITQs and TACs without ITQs.226 
 Bromley also argues that many fisheries economists incorrectly 
view ITQs as “property rights.”227 He quotes numerous articles on 
fisheries to support this view,228 but misinterprets much of the literature 
he quotes. For example, he quotes Leal229 and Arnason,230 and then states 
that both authors, according to Bromley, incorrectly claim that ITQs are 
private property rights.231 In fact, Leal does not state that ITQs are full 
property rights. Instead, he argues that private property rights should be 
granted in fisheries.232 He even explicitly acknowledges that the 
American legislation quoted by Bromley fails to create such property 
rights.233 Arnason also acknowledges that ITQs are not full property 
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rights, but makes a case – again – that they should be.234 Therefore, 
contrary to Bromley’s statement, neither of the authors claim that ITQs 
are private property rights but merely argue that (to a greater or lesser 
extent) they ought to be. 
 Bromley’s final “deceit” is the view that ITQs increase economic 
efficiency.235 In an effort to refute this position, he analyzes Figure 1, a 
fairly standard graph236 of output (catch) and fishing effort. He  attempts 
to argue that a fishery operating at effort level E1 is not more “efficient” 
than one operating at E3.237 This is inconsistent if “efficiency” is defined 
as the ratio between output and input. Both levels of effort produce the 
same catch, and, therefore, the same value, but E3 consumes more 
resources. Therefore, if a fishery operates at E1 instead of E3, all the 
unused resources could be employed in other productive economic 
activities. From the viewpoint of maximizing output in the total 
economy, E1 is more efficient. 
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It appears that Bromley’s real complaint is about fairness, not 
efficiency.238 In a fishery that operates at E1, the fishers enjoy excess 
profits, whereas in a fishery that operates at E3, they receive only normal 
profits. To resolve this unfairness, however, does not necessarily require 
abandoning efficiency and moving to E3. An appropriate taxation or 
royalty structure could reduce inequity by transferring some of that 
excess profit to the public as payment of the resource rent to which they 
are entitled.239 
C. Arguments Supporting ITQs as an Approach to Sustainability 
1. Leal and Arnason 
 Donald Leal argues that government control establishes the wrong 
incentives and that stronger private property rights should be established 
for American ITQs.240 As noted above, ITQs in the United States have 
fewer characteristics of property rights than in most other jurisdictions.241 
Though Leal is a proponent of ITQs, he argues that a TAC and ITQs 
controlled by the government result in a less efficient fishery than what 
could be achieved if ITQs carried full private property rights. 242 
 According to Leal, the fact that the government is responsible for 
setting TACs makes the government the target for fisheries interests 
groups lobbying for higher TACs.243 Leal argues that if ITQs gave 
enough security and certainty to their owners, then the fishers would 
voluntarily “take a longer view and protect the resource,” because they 
would want to safeguard their property (the fish) for their own future use 
and benefit.244 Fundamentally, this is little more than a restatement of the 
original argument, based on the “tragedy of the commons,” which 
supports creating some type of property rights for fishers. 
 Arnason argues that stronger ITQ property rights lead to greater 
economic efficiency.245 He argues that a properly structured free market 
that enables externalities (such as the long-term impact of overfishing on 
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the stock and on other fishers) to be priced correctly will result in greater 
productivity at less cost than any other system. 246 
 However, Arnason recognizes that social opposition currently limits 
further extension of the property right regime.247 He points mostly to the 
fact that if property rights are to be granted, current (common) owners 
will impliedly be deprived of their existing rights to harvest the 
resource.248 Moreover, he points out that social institutions would need to 
be overhauled before full property rights could be implemented.249 In the 
interim, a temporary situation of uncertainty in regards to property rights 
would exist.250 
 As long as the reward for environmental protection is less than the 
reward for economic exploitation, it is easy to see how these incentives 
can result in environmentally damaging results.  A scheme based on pure 
enforcement cannot incentivize proper management of business interests 
and environmental protection – such a scheme can only punish.251 The 
most obvious and straightforward way to reward conservation is simply 
to give the conserver some kind of ownership of what is conserved.252 On 
this basis, we can regard Leal and Arnason’s recommendations as efforts 
to strengthen the incentives by strengthening and expanding the property 
rights which create those incentives. Unfortunately, both authors fail to 
clearly set out how a system of full property rights would function. For 
instance, these authors do not address the key practical questions of how 
property rights could be enforced when fish are perpetually moving 
around, and regularly exist as “straddling stocks.”.253 
2. The Principal-Agent Model 
 Munro et al. argues that the Principal-Agent model of game theory 
theoretically supports the view that private property regimes such as 
ITQs will support sustainability more effectively than systems such as 
open access or limited access without individual catch shares.254 In 
general, a “principal-agent” situation exists whenever a “principal” who 
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has certain interests and goals assigns an “agent” to protect those 
interests and achieve those goals.255  
 In fisheries, the principal is the public (as represented by the 
government), and the agents are the fishers, fishing companies, and 
fishers’ unions.256 The principal defines the incentive scheme (for 
example, regulations) that will apply to the agents, and this scheme, 
along with the actions taken by the agents, determines both the returns to 
the agents and to the principal.257 We may take it for granted that the 
principal has a strong interest in conservation,258 and that the public’s 
primary goals are to maintain and, if possible, enrich the fish stock.259  
 Aligning the interests of the fishers with those of the public and the 
government is best accomplished through providing fishers with proper 
incentives for stewardship and conservation.260 As evidence that this has 
happened, Munro et al. cite significant reductions in TAC overages after 
the introduction of ITQs.261 Grimm et al. also state that ITQs have 
reduced overages and that they have led to reduced discards (bycatch), 
more accurate TACs, and better management options.262  
 “Bromley’s approach—in which government attempt to achieve 
sustainability by using regulations and enforcement—is weakened by the 
principle-agent model.”263 Bromley’s argument clearly assumes that a 
government regulator will have what might be called “good intentions”; 
that is, the regulator will genuinely direct its efforts and knowledge 
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towards socially responsible stewardship.264 This is what is in the 
interests of the public, which owns the resource.265 
 The principal-agent model, however, shows us that the government 
is not actually a principal when it regulates a publically owned resource 
such as a fish stock.266 At this point, we cannot avoid asking what 
mechanisms exist to align the interests of the principal (the public) and 
the agent (the government), and how effective these mechanisms are.267 
If these mechanisms are weak, then there is little reason to expect the 
government regulator to work consistently and strongly to achieve the 
public’s goals.268 
 In general, it appears that the mechanisms that should align the 
regulator’s goals and the public’s goals are weak and unreliable.269 
Regulators receive no financial benefit if a fish stock is well maintained, 
and suffer no financial losses if it is depleted.270271 As for non-financial 
motivators, such as unwelcome attention from the news media or 
possible lawsuits, these do not appear to happen often or quickly enough 
to strongly influence regulators’ behavior.272 Therefore, we cannot 
unreservedly accept Bromley’s assumption that regulators will reliably 
and effectively pursue the public’s interest.273 This, in turn, calls into 
question his conclusion that regulation can be effective without 
incentives based on property rights. 
3. Leader-Follower Model 
 Munro et al. argue that the fishers in a catch share or ITQ scheme 
may be playing a cooperative game, and that the resource managers are 
playing a leader-follower game with the fishers.274  In general, a leader-
follower relationship is a strategic game in economics in which the 
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leader has some advantage that enables it to move (to take an action) 
first, after which the follower acts.275 In fisheries, it exists whenever the 
law gives the resource manager authority over the first move (e.g., 
granting access to the fishery resource within a given geographical area), 
and the fishermen cannot make their move (i.e., fishing) until that has 
happened.276 It is assumed in this model that the resource managers wish 
to maximize the profits of the fishers minus the enforcement costs.277 
Also, it is assumed that the fishers will attempt to maximize their profits 
taking into account the probability of incurring a fine for taking harvests 
in excess of the TAC.278  
 In this model, the resource manager has two instruments at his/her 
disposal: (1) the establishment of a TAC; and (2) the control over fishing 
effort, which is the enforcement of the TAC.279 Because the TAC is 
decided upon prior to the fishing season, the enforcement component is 
the only instrument available to the resource manager upon 
commencement of the fishing season.280 Munro and his co-authors have 
found that the greater the degree of cooperation among fishers, the better 
it is for the resource manager.281  
 In order for cooperation to be feasible, two pre-conditions must be 
met: (1) the players must be able to communicate effectively; and (2) the 
players must be persuaded that a potential cooperative surplus exists in 
the sense that the sum of the expected payoffs to be enjoyed by the 
players from cooperation exceeds the sum of the expected payoffs to be 
enjoyed under competition.282 If these conditions exist, then cooperation 
is feasible, but it is not necessarily stable. In order for a cooperative 
game to be stable as well as feasible, further conditions must exist.283 
First, the solution to the game must be collectively Rational.284 This 
means that when each individual actor (or “player”) acts rationally, their 
actions would result in an improvement to the fishing stock.   This means 
that the most likely outcome from the game, that is when each individual 
“player” follows their rational self-action, in the case of fisheries; an 
improvement to the fishing stock  Second, cooperation must be 
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individually rational, which means that each and every player must 
continuously expect that their payoff from the cooperative game will be 
at least as great as the payoff that he or she would expect to obtain from 
behaving as if it were a competitive game—in other words, cheating.285 
There have been many instances throughout history that show that the 
consequences of competitive or non-cooperative management of fishery 
resources drive fishers toward cooperation with the ultimate consequence 
being the absence of degradation of the fish stock.286 
4. Further Empirical Evidence 
 In 2002, Arnason reviewed and assessed ITQ fisheries in eight 
countries, addressing the legal and operational nature of each regime, the 
economic impact, and any evidence of increased resource stewardship.287 
He found statistical and anecdotal evidence that fishers assumed greater 
stewardship responsibilities in seven of the eight countries, the exception 
being Namibia.288 The strongest evidence appears to come from Iceland, 
where the fishing industry cooperates actively to enforce fishing 
regulations, and New Zealand, where the fishing industry conducts 
biological research and some fisheries are nearly self-managed.289 
 In previous research, the present author has shown that the ITQ 
system that applies to sablefish in British Columbia is reasonably 
efficient and effective in its current form.290 This system provides some 
incentives that encourage fishers to conserve, maintains fair competition 
and allows reasonable access to fisheries, while avoiding excessive 
compensation claims and allowing for sufficient government control.291 
 Taken as a whole, the evidence generally supports the view that 
schemes based on some form of property rights are more likely to 
achieve socially responsible stewardship with a reasonable level of effort 
than schemes based purely on government control and enforcement.292 
To a large extent, the creation of ITQs was a response to the observed 
failure of older forms of regulation.293 Bromley’s claim that governments 
can effectively maintain sustainability is not well supported; even some 
of his own evidence conflicts with it. 
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D. Other Criticisms of ITQs 
 Several authors have presented at least two other criticisms of ITQ 
schemes which are quite separate from the question of whether or not 
they promote sustainability: the unfairness of initial free allocation294 and 
the fact that ITQ regimes can enable “armchair fishing.”295 
 With respect to initial free allocation, Bromley argues that if ITQs 
are initially allocated to fishers at no charge, it is unfair to the resource 
owners (the public) who should receive a resource rent.296 As noted 
above, the apparent reason for allocating without any charge is legal, not 
economic: Governments allocate at no charge in order to avoid making 
ITQs appear to be full property rights, which could lead to court-ordered 
compensation when an ITQ is revoked.297 From an economic perspective 
there is no reason why ITQs must be allocated for free.298 
 Even if this legal risk makes it impossible for governments to 
charge a price when ITQs are allocated, is not the only way that the 
public could be compensated. It is entirely possible to charge a royalty 
for fish caught.299 Royalties would allow the allocation of a quota to 
remain free, thus addressing concerns of potential compensation 
claims.300  Another possible approach is to increase the charge for 
licenses (which are separate from the ITQs) to reflect or approach the fair 
market price that otherwise exists for an ITQ.301 One consequence to be 
expected is that the value of the quota would decrease—but not 
necessarily dissipate—because fishers would need to reallocate part of 
the money that they now invest in the ITQ to the license.302 Of course, if 
the government charges royalties or increases the license cost, it must not 
charge so much that the fisher cannot obtain reasonable profits; 
otherwise, the scheme will be ineffective.303304 
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 Another weakness of ITQ schemes, at least in the view of some 
observers, is that they enable “armchair fishing.”305 More properly called 
“tenant fishing,” “armchair fishing” occurs when ITQ holders do not fish 
themselves, but lease their quota on an annual basis to active fishers.306 
This situation occurs partly because when quotas are actively traded, 
they are likely to become concentrated in the hands of those who can 
afford to pay the most.307 These people may not be the actual fishers; 
they might be, for example, professional investors who can obtain capital 
at much lower interest rates than most fishers can.308 Some critics 
consider this unfair on the grounds that only those who actively fish 
should profit from a fishery, or that this practice concentrates the rents 
from the fishery into too few hands.309 
 If a regulator wants to limit this practice, it can be done by such 
means as including a requirement that ITQ holders must offer their quota 
shares up for sale if they are not participating actively in the fishery, 310 
or a tax on profits obtained from ITQ leasing. Whatever the solution, it is 
certain to restrict the full and free choice that is normally associated with 
true ownership. This again suggests that it would not be useful to modify 
ITQs in such a way that they would confer full and unlimited property 
rights on their holders. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 ITQ schemes do not create full private property rights, but rather 
proprietary “interests” that fall short of full ownership.311 They are 
neither necessary nor sufficient in themselves for establishing a 
sustainable fishery.312 Nevertheless, if carefully designed and managed, 
they contribute significantly to this goal.313 Because ITQ schemes create 
a long-term proprietary interest in the fish stock, they give fishers an 
economic incentive to keep that stock healthy.314 Empirically, many ITQ 
fisheries have observed reduced TAC overages and better participation 
by fishers in conservation efforts.315 
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 It is likely that the limited non-ownership rights that are currently 
provided by ITQs are more effective for achieving sustainability than full 
property rights would be.316 It is in the interest of the government and the 
general public (as owner) for the government to retain the power to 
intervene.317 For various reasons, situations can arise in which ITQ 
holders might find exploitation rather than stewardship to be in their best 
economic interest.318 If sustainable fishing practices are abandoned and 
fish stocks are in danger of disappearing, the public interest can only be 
protected if the government has the power to intervene, and acts on this 
power.319 This type of emergency intervention might not be possible if 
the property rights granted to fishers by ITQs were made too secure and 
permanent.320  
 Many existing ITQ systems have weaknesses that are not related to 
sustainability or the absence of it.321 These weaknesses can be corrected, 
however. First, most ITQ programs initially allocated the quota shares to 
fishers at no cost, thus depriving public (as owner of the fish) of any 
compensation for what amounts to a type of expropriation.322 This 
inequity could be corrected by imposing a royalty or a tax on fishers 
based on their catch, which will effectively flow back to the public. 
Second, ITQ fisheries often allow a considerable amount of tenant 
fishing;323 this could be reduced by such means as applying an active 
management requirement to ITQ holders. 
 In summary, properly designed ITQ schemes using measures such 
as those described here can better align the interests of the government, 
the public and fishers, thus helping to reach the overall goal of 
sustainable fisheries. 
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